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Over the past decades, delusions have become the subject of growing and productive
research spanning clinical and cognitive neurosciences. Despite this, the nature of belief,
which underpins the construct of delusions, has received little formal investigation. No
account of delusions, however, would be complete without a cognitive level analysis of
belief per se. One reason for this neglect is the assumption that, unlike more established
and accessible modular psychological process (e.g., vision, audition, face-recognition,
language-processing, and motor-control systems), beliefs comprise more distributed and
therefore less accessible central cognitive processes. In this paper, we suggest some
deﬁning characteristics and functions of beliefs. Working back from cognitive accounts of
delusions, we consider potential candidate cognitive processes that may be involved in
normal belief formation. Finally, we advance a multistage account of the belief process
that could provide the basis for a more comprehensive model of belief.
Keywords: belief, belief formation, cognitive neuropsychiatry, delusion, schema
“Nothing appears more remote from the current frontiers of neuroscience
than the circuits underlying the ﬁxation and mutation of human beliefs”
(Bisiach et al., 1991, p. 1029).
INTRODUCTION
Delusions, considered as false beliefs, have been the subject of
study from a wide range of scientiﬁc and medical disciplines,
including psychiatry, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience.
While each of these approaches provides an important per-
spective on delusions, the nature of belief that underpins the
construct remains largely unspeciﬁed. Understanding the nature
of belief is of particular signiﬁcance when trying to explain
how delusions form. Over the past 40 years, several compet-
ing accounts have been proposed to explain delusions (Maher,
1974; Fear et al., 1996; Corlett et al., 2010; Coltheart et al., 2011).
Although these highlight possible impairments – including both
excesses and deﬁcits – responsible for delusions, their primary
focus has been to identify speciﬁc neuropsychological abnormal-
ities responsible for delusions and do not explicitly address the
nature of belief. As such, these accounts are necessarily incom-
plete as they do not consider the basis and broader inﬂuences of
non-pathological belief formation. A comprehensive account of
delusion will likely require reference to the processes involved in
non-pathological belief formation to fully characterise the nature
of the pathology.
This need for a conceptual framework to explain non-
pathological belief has been previously highlighted by cogni-
tive neuropsychiatry (Halligan and David, 2001), which locates
explanations of abnormal processes (psychopathology) within a
modern understanding of normal psychology. As Marshall and
Halligan (1996, p. 9) wrote:
“. . .normal informational processing systems are the domain over which
any disorder of psychological function must be deﬁned. The elucidation
of a disorder of reasoning presupposes an account of how normal rea-
soning takes place...The (correct) description of failures of reality testing
presupposes a theory of normal reality testing required for normal belief
formation.”
In the case of belief, an account of normal belief formation pro-
vides a framework to better appreciate delusions in a principled
and testable manner. It would also, of course, need to be revised
in the light of further clinical ﬁndings. Such an account, however,
begs the question as to what cognitive processes might be involved
in normal belief formation, how they relate to the current tasks
used to measure deﬁcits in delusion research, and the evolution-
ary purpose of belief. None of these provide for simple answers
when trying to provide a comprehensive theory of belief and its
pathologies. Indeed, it should be noted that some theorists ques-
tion whether all delusions can be understood in terms of beliefs
and suggest that some delusions may be better considered to be
experiences, rather than beliefs per se (Jaspers, 1963; Parnas, 2004;
Cermolacce et al., 2010; however, see also Bayne and Pacherie,
2005; Bortolotti, 2009, 2013; Langdon and Connaughton, 2013).
In this paper, we discuss some of the issues involved in studying
belief and provide a tentative road map of the stages of complexity
that a more complete account of belief will likely need to address.
DEFINING BELIEF
Belief can be deﬁned as the mental acceptance or conviction in the
truth or actuality of some idea (Schwitzgebel, 2010). According to
many analytic philosophers, a belief is a “propositional attitude”:
as a proposition, it has a speciﬁc meaning that can be expressed in
the form of a sentence; as an attitude, it involves a mental stance on
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the validity of the proposition (Schwitzgebel, 2010). Beliefs thus
involve at least two properties: (i) representational content and (ii)
assumed veracity (Stephens and Graham, 2004). It is important to
note, however, that beliefs need not be conscious or linguistically
articulated. It is likely that the majority of beliefs remain uncon-
scious or outside of immediate awareness, and are of relatively
mundane content: for example, that one’s senses reveal an environ-
ment that is physically real, that one has ongoing relationshipswith
other people, and that one’s actions in the present can bring about
outcomes in the future. Beliefs thus typically describe enduring,
unquestioned ontological representations of the world and comprise
primary convictions about events, causes, agency, and objects that
subjects use and accept as veridical.
Although obvious, beliefs are signiﬁcant because they are held
by us to be true and provide the basis for us to understand the
world and act within it (Halligan, 2006). Beliefs, or perhaps more
realistically belief systems, provide the ‘mental scaffolding’ for
appraising the environment, explaining new observations, and
constructing a sharedmeaning of theworld (Halligan,2007). Con-
sider, for example, the fundamental and widespread effects of the
transition from Ptolemaic astronomy to Copernican astronomy,
from Newtonian physics to Einsteinian physics, or from a mias-
matic theory to a germ theory of disease (see Kronemyer and
Bystritsky, 2014). In a more immediate sense, beliefs allow us to
interpret and appraise our ongoing experience, and to place our
experience within a wider meaningful context involving the past
and future. As such, beliefs can have signiﬁcant emotional conse-
quences. Beliefs also provide a basis for action by providing both a
representation of the environment and a framework of goals and
actions (Tullett et al., 2013). Given this overarching inﬂuence of
belief on our experience, beliefs that are considered dysfunctional
or inaccurate are often the target of psychological interventions
(Beck, 1976; Young et al., 2003; Hofmann et al., 2012; Kronemyer
and Bystritsky, 2014).
In everyday life, our understanding of belief is provided by a
framework of folk psychology. This folk account frequently refers,
in particular, to a notion of belief in understanding the thoughts
and intentions of others. In community surveys, members of
the general population typically endorse a relatively coherent set
of belief characteristics (Pechey and Halligan, 2012b). The vast
majority of subjects, for example, when asked to identify the
characteristics of belief, consider it to involve a strongly held con-
viction that is resistant to change, provides a veridical framework
for explaining how things are or should be, and is capable of inﬂu-
encing thoughts, behavior, feelings, attitudes, and decisions (Pechey
and Halligan, 2012b). The high degree of consistency in deﬁning
beliefs in the general community is both reassuring and informa-
tive. It also supports the need for belief or a belief-like construct
when accounting for how we interact with the world and each
other.
Beliefs can be distinguished from other types of cognitive “rep-
resentations” that are more frequently referred to in contemporary
cognitive science, such as memory, knowledge, and attitudes. In
contrast to memory, beliefs can apply to present and future events,
as well as the past. In some cases, it may also be possible to distin-
guish between memories that are believed (as in the vast majority
of memories) and memories that are not believed (as in false
memories when a person recognises that the remembered event
could not have occurred; Loftus, 2003). In contrast to knowledge,
beliefs are, by deﬁnition, held with conviction and regarded as
true (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Wyer
and Albarracín, 2005). Beliefs also typically involve a large self-
referential element that may not be present in knowledge. Finally,
in contrast to attitudes (as understood in social psychology, rather
than the broader philosophical usage), beliefs need not contain
an evaluative component, which is a deﬁning characteristic of
attitudes in social psychology (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). On the
other hand, beliefs may provide a framework for understanding
attitudes (e.g., the belief that an object has a particular property
and the belief that this property should be evaluated in a particu-
lar way; for further discussion, see Kruglanski and Stroebe, 2005;
Wyer and Albarracín, 2005). In all three cases, however, there is
likely to be considerable overlap with belief and the different con-
structs may involve shared underpinnings. Semantic memory, for
example, which involves memory for meaning, is likely to have
many commonalities with belief.
NEGLECT OF BELIEF
Unlike other cognitive processes – such as perception, memory,
attention, language, and actions systems – beliefs have not received
widespread empirical consideration and there is no complete cog-
nitive account of belief (Bell et al., 2006a). There are several reasons
for this neglect. The ﬁrst may stem from the philosophical debates
around the nature of belief itself (Churchland and Churchland,
2013). There is, for example, no philosophical consensus on what
belief is (McKay and Dennett, 2009) or even what constitutes a
delusion (Spitzer, 1990; David, 1999; Coltheart, 2007). Whereas
some philosophers have argued that our folk psychological under-
standing of belief is more or less accurate (Fodor, 1975; Dretske,
1988), others have argued that it is wrong and will be superseded
by a radically different theory with the advancement of neuro-
science (see Churchland, 1981; Baker, 1987, 1995; Churchland,
1999; Dennett, 1999; for a discussion of these issues, see Bell et al.,
2006a; Schwitzgebel, 2010). It is important to note, however, that
most of these accounts do not deny that the scientiﬁc investiga-
tion of belief is possible (see, however, Stich, 1983). Instead, the
accounts offer different predictions about what future scientiﬁc
investigation will uncover as the basis of what we call “belief” and
how this will relate to current common-sense understanding. Even
the “eliminativist view,” which holds that the ‘folk’ understanding
of beliefs is mistaken, predicts that our ‘folk’ understanding of
belief will be replaced by a better speciﬁed neuropsychological
theory.
Another reason for the neglect of belief stems from the chal-
lenges of articulating a cognitive account for a complex process
that is likely to be supported by a number of component processes
(Bisiach et al., 1991; Langdon and Connaughton, 2013). Accord-
ing to the inﬂuential views put forward by American philosopher
and cognitive scientist Fodor (1983), beliefs are less tractable for
study than the low level peripheral cognitive processes or modules
(such as attention, memory, perception, and language). According
to Fodor, “unencapsulated, central processes” such as ﬁxed beliefs
do not share the same characteristics or properties of modularity
and instead draw on information from many sources (Fodor,
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1983). As a result, it is difﬁcult to elucidate the speciﬁc high level
cognitive systems involved. In a similar way, Quine and Ullian
(1970) proposed that beliefs are unlikely to exist in isolation and
typically form an interconnected web in which beliefs “cohere”
with one another to avoid cognitive dissonance. This complexity
of beliefs poses challenges for empirical investigation (Damasio,
2000; Corlett et al., 2010). In practical terms, it makes it difﬁcult
to isolate beliefs from other cognitive processes and operationalise
their investigation. Perhaps as a result, and despite their con-
siderable importance for a complete description of a cognitive
neuroscience, the cognitive nature of beliefs has attracted little
formal investigation (Bell et al., 2006a; Brugger and Mohr, 2008;
Bell and Halligan, 2013).
A FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON BELIEF
Despite this neglect, it is possible to identify four key, albeit over-
lapping functions of belief. First and foremost, beliefs provide a
consistent and coherent representation of a subject’s world and
the subject’s place within it. Such an intuitively coherent and ever-
present framework allows subjects to pursue goals, avoid threats,
and regulate their behavior in response to changes in their envi-
ronment. This framework is presupposed by other higher-order
cognitive functions, such as planning and decision-making, which
require beliefs to conceptualise and evaluate the current situation,
actions, and consequences. This framework thus provides the basis
of action (Tullett et al., 2011, 2013). As Tullett et al. (2013, p. 401)
note:
“Every action that we take is grounded in an elaborate web of beliefs and
goals. Take the simple act of opening a door. Such an act depends on our
beliefs about what lies beyond the door, as well as what is available to
us in our current location. At an even more basic level, our attempt to
open the door is rooted in a belief that we understand how a door works,
and are capable of using it. Furthermore, without the goal of pursuing
something beyond the door, the act of opening the door would probably
not take place.”
While such a framework may often be assumed, securing a
sense of meaning appears particularly critical when deﬁning one’s
identity and coping with uncertainty (Inzlicht et al., 2011).
Second, as a stable representation, beliefs provide an explana-
tory framework for interpreting the world and processing incom-
ing information. When faced with situations that threaten the
coherence of the collective framework, subjects typically attempt
to resolve inconsistencies by seeking to restore the over-arching
sense of meaning. The coherence provided by the subject’s web
of beliefs allows the subject to quickly integrate and, if neces-
sary, reconcile new observations with previous observations held
in memory. In this way, collective representations can evolve over
time in response to new experiences, yet still represent the subject’s
pooled understanding based on the past. This adaptive function
allows subject’s greater capacity to understand and adjust to their
environment. It also allows a subject to quickly interpret ambigu-
ous or incomplete information and respond accordingly. Beliefs
thus allow subjects to go beyond the available sensory information
and act effectively in their environment.
Third, at a more basic level, the explanatory framework of
beliefs helps to conﬁgure and calibrate lower-level modular
cognitive systems, such as perception, language, memory, and
attention. Beliefs provide the interpretive “lens” that shape our
experience of the world. Consequently, beliefs are not just the
reportable end-product of cognitive processes; they also generate
expectations that help deﬁne on-line sensory experience through
top–down processing. It is well established that phenomenological
experience is not simply the registration of sensory inputs through
domain speciﬁc transducers, but rather the constructive integra-
tion of sensory information ﬁltered through pre-existing beliefs.
This is nicely illustrated in visual illusions: a large body of research
has shown that perception of an object or scene is not determined
solely by the empirical sensory information, but rather is subject
to top–down processes and expectations (Gregory, 1997). In the
same way, our beliefs about the world preﬁgure our perceptual sys-
tem. Our perception of the world thus involves the reconstruction
of both sensory and pre-existing information about the world.
This interpretative ﬁlter provides for the meaning, structure, and
unity of immediate experience (Gregory, 1997).
Finally, at an interpersonal level, beliefs serve important social
functions. In addition to allowing subjects to navigate social
relationships and interpret other people’s motivations, beliefs
provide a sense of community and security. Shared beliefs help
deﬁne group norms and values. They provide a common under-
standing that enables interaction and facilitates social governance.
They also help co-ordinate groups of individuals and provide
for the development and transmission of cultural representations
(see Sperber, 1997). These social functions may be particularly
important in the acquisition of knowledge: they allow individuals
within the community to acquire knowledge about their environ-
ment without necessarily learning this knowledge ﬁrst hand and
being exposed to any accompanying risks. The social functions
of beliefs also means that beliefs cannot simply be understood by
studying individuals in isolation and instead need to be related
to their broader social context, including other beliefs in their
milieu.
CHARACTERISTICS AND DIMENSIONS OF BELIEF
Beliefs are best considered as beingmultidimensional. Beliefs share
a number of common properties but can vary across dimensions
within these properties. These include the following:
(1) Beliefs have different origins. Beliefs, for example, can be
formed through direct experience or by accepting information
froma trustedor authoritative source (Hughes andSims,1997;
Langdon, 2013).
(2) Beliefs vary in terms of the level of evidence and support
they command. Some beliefs have high levels of evidence,
while others appear to be accepted without requiring much
evidential support (Lamont, 2007).
(3) Beliefs can said to be “held” at different levels of awareness.
Whereas some beliefsmay involve considerable conscious pre-
occupation and rumination (susceptible to reﬂective control),
other beliefs may appear implicit, unconscious, and only evi-
dent by inference from behavior (not susceptible to reﬂective
control; Young et al., 2003).
(4) Beliefs vary considerably in generality and scope. Beliefsmay
refer, for example, to speciﬁc objects or individuals, groups of
objects and people, or whole classes of objects and people
(Freeman, 2007).
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(5) Beliefs vary in their degree of personal reference. A belief can
be limited to the speciﬁc individual holding the belief (e.g., “I
am unique”); extend to friends, relatives and other in-group
members; or apply to other groups of people or all people
equally (Freeman, 2007).
(6) Beliefs can be held with different levels of conviction or
degrees of conﬁdence. This can range from ﬁrmly held (e.g.,
in the case of basic physical laws) to relative uncertainty (e.g.,
in the case of unfamiliar topics; Peters et al., 2004). In some
beliefs, this conviction may even ﬂuctuate over time or across
different contexts (Bisiach et al., 1991; Connors and Coltheart,
2011).
(7) Beliefs vary in their resistance to change in response to
counter-evidence and social pressure. While related to con-
viction, people can also vary in how open they are to
disconﬁrming evidence toward their belief and to considering
alternative points of view.
(8) Beliefs can vary in their impact on cognition and behav-
ior. This may likewise be inﬂuenced by degree of conviction.
Whereas people may act on some beliefs, they may fail to act
on other beliefs that they verbally endorse (Bortolotti, 2013).
(9) Beliefs can produce different emotional consequences.
Whereas some beliefsmay be relatively innocuous or even self-
serving, other beliefs may cause considerable distress (Beck,
1976).
(10) Beliefs vary in the degree to which they are shared by other
people. Whereas some beliefs are very common, other beliefs
may be comparatively unusual (e.g., in the case of some
delusions; David, 1999).
It remains to be seen how these different properties are cog-
nitively and neutrally instantiated. It is possible, for example,
that some properties reﬂect qualitatively distinct subtypes of
beliefs. It is also possible that some properties instead sim-
ply reﬂect variation along a continuum within a single type of
belief.
A particularly important feature of beliefs is their consistency
and interrelationship with one another. According to Quine and
Ullian (1970), beliefs form an interconnected web in which beliefs
somehow“cohere”with one another to avoid discord. This is sup-
ported to some extent by empirical evidence, which indicates that
the degree of co-endorsement of beliefs within thematic groupings
is greater than random occurrence (Pechey and Halligan, 2012a).
In a similar way, Thagard (2000) has argued that beliefs cohere
with other beliefs that jointly support each other and extends the
notion of consistency to a wider range of cognitions, including
those involved in perception and decision-making. The accep-
tance or rejection of beliefs thus depends on maximizing their
coherence with both beliefs and other representations. A related
notion of consistency is also present in Festinger’s (1962) cogni-
tive dissonance theory, which suggest that humans are strongly
predisposed to seek consistency among their beliefs, particularly
when holding contradictory beliefsmight compromise self-esteem
(Cooper, 2007).
The degree of coherence between beliefs also has implications
for interpreting and studying individual beliefs in isolation. A par-
ticular belief, for example, may entail a number of similar beliefs
on related topics. Indeed, some philosophers have argued that
beliefs can only be understood by relating them to a background
of other beliefs and desires (referred to here as a holistic account;
Davidson, 1973, 1984). In this way, beliefs form part of a wider
network of beliefs that restricts what new beliefs are possible (e.g.,
Quine and Ullian, 1970; Davidson, 1973, 1984). Other philoso-
phers, in contrast, have argued that beliefs exist as discrete entities
that are largely independent of one another (referred to here as
an atomistic account; Price, 1934, 1969). In this way, a person
may hold seemingly contradictory beliefs. While there is empir-
ical evidence of some degree of coherence of belief, the extent
to which beliefs are dependent on each other remains an impor-
tant theoretical question (Pechey and Halligan, 2012a). It also has
important implications for research: Whereas a holistic account,
for example, suggests that a particular belief will involve widely
dispersed neural activation, an atomistic account suggests that the
relevant neural activation will be relatively circumscribed (Bell
et al., 2006a).
Another signiﬁcant issue for studying the properties of belief
is the degree to which subjects are aware of their beliefs. In prag-
matic terms, a person’s beliefs are often taken to be what they
themselves declare them to be. This type of explicit expression,
however, requires insight, reﬂection, and memory of the belief,
as well as linguistic representation. The vast majority of beliefs,
however, are not likely to be conscious or reportable, but instead
simply taken as granted without reﬂection or awareness. Such
beliefs may be inferred from a subject’s behavior, but otherwise
remain unconscious and enacted largely involuntary. This auto-
maticity also applies to the formation of new beliefs. We cannot,
for example, choose our beliefs – we cannot choose to believe that
it is raining if it is not – and instead often discover our beliefs
when we reﬂect and consider what they are (see Engel, 2002). This
automaticity is necessary to clearly and rapidly guide a person’s
responses to their environment. Thus, where there is a discrepancy
between a person’s verbal declarations and behavior, it is likely that
their behavior may provide stronger evidence of their beliefs as it
is these representations of their situation that are guiding their
actions. It is also possible that some beliefs are formed before a
person has acquired language, and so may be more difﬁcult to
articulate in linguistic terms (Young et al., 2003).
CANDIDATE COGNITIVE PROCESSES
Belief formation is likely to involve a number of distinct cog-
nitive processes. One promising avenues for explaining the
nature of beliefs has come from the study of clinically disabling,
strongly-held mono-delusional beliefs. Although some philoso-
phers question whether delusions are pathological versions of
belief (e.g., Currie, 2000), such accounts remain unconvincing
because there is no empirical evidence to suggest that delusions
are qualitatively different from the range of non-delusional beliefs
(see Bayne and Pacherie, 2005; Bortolotti, 2009, 2013). In addi-
tion, the study of delusions has shown the potential to contribute
much to the understanding of beliefs themselves. Over the last four
decades, researchers have attempted to explain delusions in terms
of breakdowns or dysfunctions to a variety of different putative
normal cognitive processes. By proposing and examining the puta-
tive causes (i.e., pathology) behind delusions, it has been possible
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to come up with a number of candidate cognitive process (David
and Halligan, 1996, 2000; Young, 2000; Halligan and David, 2001).
Cognitive theories of delusion formation generally fall into
three camps:
• top–down processes that concentrate on reasoning, moti-
vational inﬂuences, and cognitive biases,
• those focusing on anomalous experiences that play a critical
role in the belief process and
• a combination of both (see Bell et al., 2006b).
The top–down approaches tend to focus on non-bizarre (in
particular, persecutory) delusions, whereas the second type often
consider bizarre mono-delusions to illustrate their models (for
a discussion of the distinction between non-bizarre and bizarre
delusions, see Jaspers, 1963; Parnas, 2004; Bell et al., 2006c;
Cermolacce et al., 2010). As can be seen from the model of per-
secutory delusion formation proposed by Freeman et al. (2002),
this is often just a matter of emphasis (in reference to the partic-
ular delusion type in mind), with researchers acknowledging that
both factors may actually play a role.
Across these approaches, several candidate cognitive processes
have been proposed to contribute to or account for delusion
formation (summarized in Table 1). Some of these have been
developed with particular reference to certain types of delusions,
whereas others have been hypothesized to play a role in the forma-
tion of all or most delusions. Given the varied nature of delusions,
it seems likely that there are several routes to delusion formation,
with these cognitive processes playing roles to differing degrees in
different types of delusions.
A number of accounts have focused on persecutory delusions
(the belief that others are conspiring to cause one harm), a fre-
quently reported type of delusion. Freeman et al. (2002), for
example, outlined a number of factors that could cause this delu-
sion within a biopsychosocial model. According to this account,
some individuals are vulnerable to delusions due to a range of
social, genetic, biological, and psychological factors, particularly
in times of stress. As a result, these individuals may have anoma-
lous experiences, such as hallucinations, intrusive thoughts, or
actions that appear involuntary. Some individuals, in searching for
an explanation for these anomalous experiences, can be inﬂuenced
by cognitive biases, emotions, and pre-existing beliefs that empha-
sise the notion of threat. The jumping-to-conclusions bias, for
instance, in which participants arrive at decisions using very little
information may persuade individuals to quickly accept explana-
tions that might otherwise be considered implausible. Anxiety,
as well depression and anger, might lead to explanations based
on threat. Pre-existing beliefs, particularly those that consider
the world as hostile and the individual susceptible to threat, may
also lead to persecutory explanations. As a consequence of these
processes, explanations arising in a search for meaning and that
are based on the idea of persecution may become accepted as
belief (Freeman, 2007).
Other theorists have emphasised different deﬁcits that may
contribute to persecutory delusions. According to Frith (1992),
deﬁcits in meta-representation and theory of mind (the abil-
ity to infer and reason about mental states in others) can also
lead to delusion formation. As a result of such deﬁcits, patients
may come to misinterpret the intentions and actions of others
as hostile, leading to poor social outcomes. In contrast, Ben-
tall et al. (1994, 2001) suggest that attributional biases, designed
to compensate for low self-esteem, may also generate persecu-
tory ideation. In particular, to avoid negative views of themselves
reaching awareness, some individuals display excessive externaliz-
ing and personalizing biases – where they attribute negative events
to the harmful intentions of other people, rather than to them-
selves or circumstances. While evidence for the deﬁcits proposed
by Frith and Bentall remains unclear (Garety and Freeman, 1999,
2013; Freeman, 2007), both deﬁcits can be readily incorporated
into Freeman and colleagues’ more general model of persecutory
delusions.
Other accounts have focused on more bizarre delusions. These
theories have likewise assumed that the content of delusions
may arise from the person’s attempt to explain their unusual
experiences (James, 1890; Reed, 1972; Maher, 1974, 1988). Ellis
and Young (1990), for example, observed that the content of
misidentiﬁcation delusions could be explained in terms of various
disruptions to normal face processing, including person identiﬁ-
cation. In the case of Capgras delusion (the belief that a familiar
person has been replaced by an impostor), for example, damage to
an autonomic response in face processing can lead somepatients to
lose their heightened arousal to familiar faces. As a result, patients
encounter their loved ones without the normal heightened arousal
they would expect to experience, which may lead to the idea that
a familiar person has been replaced by a look-alike impostor (Ellis
and Young, 1990, 1996; Stone and Young, 1997). In support of
this account, a number of studies have found that patients with
Capgras show reduced autonomic responses (indexed by skin con-
ductance recordings) to photographs of familiar faces and similar
low levels of autonomic response to familiar and unfamiliar faces
(Ellis et al., 1997; Hirstein and Ramachandran, 1997; Brighetti
et al., 2007).
While going somewhere toward accounting for the content
of Capgras delusion, this bespoke face-processing account alone
was insufﬁcient and had difﬁculty explaining the maintenance
of delusions and other types of delusion. It also had difﬁculty
accounting formany patientswith face-processing deﬁcits whodid
not develop face-processing related delusions (Tranel et al., 1995).
To account for such cases, Langdon andColtheart (2000) proposed
a generic two-factor theory. According to this account, two sepa-
rate factors were considered responsible, working in combination
to produce a delusion’s content and its subsequent maintenance.
The ﬁrst pathology factor involving the normal system (Factor 1)
explains the delusion’s content and typically involves a neuropsy-
chological anomaly affecting perceptual, emotional, or autonomic
processing. In the case of Capgras, the person’s face does not elicit
the usual autonomic response. The second pathology factor (Fac-
tor 2) helps explain the delusion’s maintenance and involves a
deﬁcit in a hypothetical normal belief evaluation and revision
system. Patients who have both pathology Factors 1 and 2 are
therefore likely to develop a delusion (McKay et al., 2005; Colt-
heart, 2007, 2010; Coltheart et al., 2011). While the two-factor
theory is an important account of delusions, it does not fully
explain why the delusional explanation for Factor 1 is chosen
when a number of other alternate explanations are also possible. In
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Table 1 | Some of the main cognitive factors proposed to contribute to delusion formation.
Proposed deficit/bias Main account Key proponents
Perceptual experience Delusions are the result of normal reasoning applied
to abnormal perceptual experiences
Reed (1972), Maher (1974, 1988)
Face processing Capgras delusion stems from a covert affective face
processing deﬁcit (other misidentiﬁcation delusions
result from other face processing deﬁcits)
Ellis andYoung (1990, 1996), Ellis et al. (1997),
Stone andYoung (1997), Ellis and Lewis (2001)
Attribution processes Persecutory delusions result from excessive
attribution of negative events to other people in an
attempt to protect self-esteem
Bentall et al. (1994, 2001)
Inferential reasoning “Jumping to conclusions” reasoning style causes
delusional beliefs to be formed from low levels of
perceptual information despite pre-existing knowledge
Hemsley (1993), Garety and Hemsley (1994),
Garety and Freeman (1999, 2013)
Belief evaluation In response to anomalous experience or data, a
deﬁcit/bias in belief evaluation leads to the
acceptance of an unlikely hypothesis as belief
Langdon and Coltheart (2000), Coltheart (2007,
2010), Coltheart et al. (2011)
Metacognitive beliefs Delusions result from information that is accurately
perceived but is misinterpreted due to faulty self and
social knowledge
Morrison (2001)
Metarepresentation Delusions of reference, misinterpretation and
persecution may result from misinterpretation of
another person’s behavior or intentions; delusions of
control may result from losing the ability to identify
self-generated thoughts and actions as one’s own
Frith (1992)
Cycle of preconscious perceptual
processing
Preconscious expectancies, driven by existing beliefs,
facilitate the interpretation of perceptual information,
which in turn reinforces these beliefs
Fleminger (1992)
Interpretive frenzy and reference
focus
Unconstrained, excessive inferences and ideas of
reference due to left hemisphere overactivity lead to
delusional content
Braun and Suffren (2011)
Disturbance in error-dependent
updating of inferences
Inappropriate “prediction errors” – the mismatch
between expectancy and experience – lead patients
to attend to and infer relationships between unrelated
events
Fletcher and Frith (2009), Corlett et al. (2010)
Effect of delusion on experience A delusion restructures interpretation of sensory
experience, such that the patient experiences the
world as if the delusion were true, thereby reinforcing
the delusion
Stone andYoung (1997), Davies et al. (2001),
Young (2008, 2010)
Reciprocal relationships between
delusions and memory
A delusion encourages encoding and retrieval of
memories that are consistent with the delusion’s
content, which, in turn, reinforces the delusion.
Berna et al. (2014)
addition, large numbers of people also claim to hold clinically sim-
ilar unusual beliefs (Pechey and Halligan, 2011) and it is unlikely
that all are due to neuropsychological damage (cf. Coltheart et al.,
2011).
Another inﬂuential theory is the “prediction error” account
of delusions (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Corlett et al., 2010).
According to this model, inappropriate “prediction errors” –
the perceived inability of existing beliefs to account for sensory
experience – can predispose patients to attend to and infer rela-
tionships between unrelated events. When viewed from the
framework of a two-factor account, such aberrant prediction error
may explain the content of the delusion. It may explain, for exam-
ple, why particular stimuli become salient to the individual and the
focus of delusional beliefs. Abnormal prediction errors may also
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provide an account for the maintenance of the delusion as well.
According to Corlett et al. (2009), aberrant prediction errors could
re-evoke the content of the delusion over time in a way that leads
to reconsolidation of the delusion in the absence of any supporting
evidence (Corlett et al., 2009). Thus, prediction error offers a par-
simonious single-factor account of delusions. Many details of this
model and the empirical evidence supporting it are still subject to
discussions (Grifﬁths et al., 2014). Nevertheless, although propos-
ing a single factor, the prediction error account appears to posit
different mechanisms to account for how a delusion is formed
and maintained. So it appears that the distinction of content and
maintenance remains important, at least conceptually, to account
for delusions.
STAGES OF BELIEF FORMATION
Based largely on evidence from clinical delusions and existing cog-
nitive accounts of these pathologies, it is likely that a complete
model of belief formation will involve a number of distinct stages.
In this section, we provide a tentative ﬁve stage non-recursive
account (see Figure 1). Given its dependency on delusion research,
we also brieﬂy note, where relevant, how these stages might inform
understanding of clinical delusions. It should be emphasised, how-
ever, that subjects are most likely not aware of these stages as many
of the cognitive process involved occur automatically and outside
of conscious awareness. It also remains an empirical question as to
whether all types of delusions can be understood within a frame-
work of normal belief formation (see Jaspers, 1963; Parnas, 2004;
Bortolotti, 2009, 2013; Cermolacce et al., 2010).
I. PRECURSOR
The ﬁrst critical stage is a precursor, which can be viewed as the
trigger stage in belief formation. This distal trigger helps shape
and determine the content of a yet-to-be generated new belief
(a proto-belief). For many beliefs, the precursor may comprise a
veridical or impaired perceptual input that subsequently initiates
FIGURE 1 | A non-recursive five-stage account of belief formation.
the subject’s search for meaning. This can occur when an unex-
pected perceptual input occurs or is unusual, so does not match
with a person’s current expectations and existing web of beliefs
(Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Corlett et al., 2010). Alternatively, the
perceptual input may be emotionally salient or self-relevant in
some way. In either case, the precursor triggers active monitoring
processes to detect and explain the input. In the case of clini-
cal delusions, anomalous experiences, such as those arising from
a neuropsychological deﬁcit to primary cognitive systems, have
been regarded as a potent and consistent precursor (Langdon and
Coltheart, 2000; Connors et al., 2015). It is also possible, how-
ever, that unusual (i.e., inexplicable) environmental events can
lead to incomplete or inferentially incorrect explanations without
any structural pathology.
Not all new beliefs, though, need to arise from perturbations of
direct experience (Sperber, 2009; Sperber et al., 2010). Beliefs can
stem from interaction with other people and media in our social
environment, or from secondary informational sources, such as
books, newspapers and television. In such cases, a precursor might
be a verbal or written communication. As already noted, the ability
to communicate beliefs serves important social functions, such as
facilitating group cohesion and co-ordination. In the case of delu-
sions, socially transmitted ideas could also precipitate delusional
content without the need for an unusual experience or structural
pathology. Delusional ideas in a person’s immediate environment,
for example, can lead to shared delusions, whereby two or more
people come to hold the same delusional belief (Hughes and Sims,
1997; Langdon, 2013). Alternatively, ideas from a person’s social
and cultural environment can provide a precursor for a delusion.
This is evident, for example, in delusions that incorporate speciﬁc
technologies (e.g., Bell et al., 2005; McNally and Clancy, 2005)
or involve themes that are speciﬁc to a historical period (e.g.,
Speak, 1990; Škodlar et al., 2008; Cannon and Kramer, 2011; Gold
and Gold, 2012, 2014). In both cases, ready-formed social ideas
may form the precursor to a belief without the need for further
interpretation.
Beliefs can also arise from conscious or unconscious intro-
spection. This includes, in particular, cognitive reappraisals of
past events or perturbation to pre-existing beliefs. Sperber (1997),
for instance, provides the example of asking someone whether
there are any kangaroos on Jupiter. The answer to this question is
unlikely to be already stored in memory as a belief (unless the per-
son answering it has already heard the question before). However,
on the basis of other pre-existing beliefs, a person may quickly
derive an answer. In these cases, the precursor may be the pre-
existing beliefs or the stimulus that instigated the search. As a
result, pre-existing ideas or autobiographical past memories may
provide the trigger for a new belief, providing they become salient
in some way.
II. SEARCH FOR MEANING
The second critical stage of the belief formation process is
the search for meaning. This involves explaining or account-
ing for the experienced precursor and accommodating it within
the existing web of beliefs. This search for meaning may draw
upon pre-existing beliefs and other information relevant to the
input, but is also guided by the constraint of avoiding cognitive
www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 5 | Article 1588 | 7
Connors and Halligan Cognitive account of belief
inconsistency. This stage accounts for how the precursor acquires
the speciﬁc meaning(s) it does and likely involves abductive
reasoning – reasoning to the best explanation for the observed
phenomena while accounting for pre-existing beliefs (Johnson-
Laird, 2006; Coltheart et al., 2010). The outcomeof this stage could
result in several proto-beliefs or candidate proposals to account for
the perturbation. This search formeaning to produce proto-beliefs
is likely to be a mandatory and automatic process that complex
cognitive systems are programmed to initiate and satisfy, particu-
larly given the potentially destabilizing consequences of protracted
uncertainty.
As any search for meaning is likely to be strongly constrained
by pre-existing beliefs, certain explanations are more likely to
be favored or competitive. Associations between the content
of certain beliefs may also be more readily acquired than oth-
ers. There is evidence, for example, that people more readily
develop a phobia of snakes than for power sockets, which can
be just as dangerous (Seligman, 1971). Likewise, there is evidence
at a population level that the degree of belief co-endorsement
between beliefs within thematic groupings is greater than ran-
dom occurrence (Pechey and Halligan, 2012a). As a result of
these constraints, the amount of inference required in a search
for meaning may vary depending on the nature of the precursor.
When an observation is unambiguous or appears highly con-
sistent with pre-existing beliefs, it may simply be accepted as
veridical without any attempt at further explanation. Alterna-
tively, if the observation is more ambiguous, a greater amount
of inference and cognitive effort may be required to generate
an explanation (see Davies et al., 2001; Langdon and Bayne,
2010).
Given that any search for meaning will largely depend on
pre-existing beliefs and knowledge, the outcome is likely to be
highly personal and idiosyncratic. Overarching narratives that
are implicit in subjects’ pre-existing beliefs may be particularly
inﬂuential in determining the outcome of the search. In addi-
tion, subjects may adopt particular attributional styles – habitual
tendencies to explain events in certain ways (Kelley and Michela,
1980) – whilst also relying on heuristics to save on cognitive
effort (Kahneman et al., 1982; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011;
Kahneman, 2011). Subjects’ emotion and mood may also be
relevant inﬂuences at this stage. Explanations may be selected
because they are congruent with a prevailing emotion or dom-
inant mood. Anxiety, for example, may foster explanations
involving threat or danger, whereas happiness might prompt
more benign explanations. Alternatively, explanations may be
selected based on their affective consequences (Kunda, 1990;
Gilovich, 1991; Helzer and Dunning, 2012). Explanations, for
example, that offer certainty and comfort or maintain self-
esteem and internal consistency are more likely to be selected
over other explanations that do not provide these beneﬁts, pro-
viding they are sufﬁciently plausible and can be rationalised.
Motivation and emotion may constitute a particularly power-
ful determinant of evaluative beliefs (Kruglanski and Stroebe,
2005).
It remains unclear, however, the degree to which the hypotheses
and proto-beliefs are scrutinised at this initial stage. Gilbert and
colleagues have juxtaposedwhat they termCartesian and Spinozan
views of belief (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1993). According to
a Cartesian view, the initial formation of a hypothesis – a proto-
belief – requires further evaluation in a subsequent stage before the
belief is adopted or accepted. In contrast, according to a Spinozan
view, the initial formation of a hypothesis also entails the tem-
porary adoption of that hypothesis; only once it is adopted as
belief will it be further assessed to determine whether it will be
maintained or rejected (see Davies and Egan, 2013). Gilbert and
colleagues presented some evidence that the Spinozan account –
namely the formation of the proto-belief involves some tempo-
rary acceptance of the proto-belief – is the more likely of the two.
Nevertheless, while the accounts differ in terms of the degree to
which the initial hypothesis is adopted before further scrutiny,
both accounts agree that some form of further belief evaluation
is likely to occur in belief formation (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al.,
1993).
In the case of delusions, the search for meaning also plays a
critical role. As already noted, delusions can result from attempts
to explain an anomalous experience or precursor (Maher, 1974;
Coltheart et al., 2011). Importantly, however, these attempts are
likely to be strongly inﬂuenced by a person’s pre-existing back-
ground, knowledge, and beliefs. Attributional style, heuristics,
and cognitive biases that are present to varying degrees in the nor-
mal populationmay also lead subjects to favor certain explanations
over others (Kihlstrom andHoyt, 1988). In addition, the search for
meaning could be constrained by selective impairment or injury.
Cognitive deﬁcits, for example, could lead patients to prioritise
emotion-driven explanations or initial hypotheses on the basis of
immediate experience. So while a precursor might strongly inﬂu-
ence the content of a delusion, it cannot be said to fully determine
it. The ﬁnal content of the delusion arises only following the search
for meaning to explain it.
The search for meaning thus helps to explain the observed vari-
ability within clinically presented delusions, as individuals may
select and entertain different proto-beliefs to account for simi-
lar precursors. Individuals, for example, may conclude that their
loved one has been replaced by a robot rather than an impostor (as
in variants of Capgras), or that organisations are physically spying
on them rather than reading their thoughts (as in variants of per-
secutory delusions). These proto-beliefs may also be inﬂuenced by
the initial response of family, friends, and clinicians.
The search for meaning also helps to explain why not all indi-
viduals who experience neuropsychological anomalies develop
delusions warranting clinical attention. Individuals may simply
select a non-delusional explanation due to pre-existing beliefs or
social input. When a delusional account is generated, it may be
chosen because no alternative explanations are readily available,
the delusional account is simply the most compelling (Freeman
et al., 2004), or dysfunction in someor all stages of belief formation
process have produced a sub-optimal search for meaning.
Delusions, however, may arise in the search for meaning stage
without an anomalous precursor that bears an obvious resem-
blance to the ﬁnal belief. Some perturbation or corruption of
existing belief systems could lead to the interpretation of innocu-
ous stimuli in the environment in a way that is considered to be
delusional. Once an individual adopts an unusual belief or delu-
sion, for example, it behoves them to interpret and re-interpret
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other aspects of their experience in linewith the pre-existing belief.
Pre-existingdelusions therefore contribute to the sematic ﬁlter that
is applied to attempts to explain anomalous data. This, in turn, per-
petuates the original delusion and may potentially produce other
related and supportive unusual beliefs.
In a similar way, ideas from a person’s social and cultural
environment could inﬂuence the search for meaning and lead to
delusional content without an obvious precursor. Individuals who
trust or dependonpeoplewith delusions, for example,might come
to adopt these delusions as explanations for events that occur in
their own lives (Hughes and Sims, 1997; Langdon, 2013). Ideas
derived fromaperson’s broader cultural environment can also lead
to a delusion by providing a ready-made account of phenomena.
As already noted, for example, there are a range of delusions that
incorporate information from speciﬁc social and cultural contexts
in their content (Hsia and Tsai, 1981; Speak, 1990; Chowdhury,
1996; Tateyama et al., 1998; Stompe et al., 1999; Bell et al., 2005;
McNally and Clancy, 2005; Gold and Gold, 2012, 2014), as well as
evidence of changing themes in delusions over time (Škodlar et al.,
2008; Cannon and Kramer, 2011). In these cases, shared social and
cultural ideas bias and shape the search for meaning to produce a
pathological belief.
III. CANDIDATE BELIEF EVALUATION
The third critical stage is the evaluation of the competing proto-
beliefs in terms of their ability to account for the precursor and
their consistency with pre-existing beliefs. Proto-beliefs need to be
both observationally adequate (i.e., explain the precursor), yet also
consistent with existing beliefs (Stone and Young, 1997; McKay,
2012). As a result, the belief evaluation process may vary across
individuals with different beliefs and particular reasoning biases.
For the most part, it is likely that there will be a predisposition
toward conserving existing beliefs to avoid perturbations to inter-
nal consistency (Gilovich, 1991). Thus proto-beliefs that are more
consistent with pre-existing beliefs are more likely to be accepted
with less scrutiny or cognitive effort. In contrast, proto-beliefs
that do not ﬁt with pre-existing beliefs may be regarded as less
competitive. In this case, people may resist the challenge of a
proto-belief that is inconsistent with their existing beliefs – what
they may consider to be anomalous – by subjecting it to particu-
larly intense scrutiny, possibly even at a conscious level (Lord et al.,
1979; Gilovich, 1991; Halligan et al., 1993).
Belief evaluation, even in the absence of frank pathology, has
several limitations. People tend to adopt non-optimal hypothesis-
testing strategies (Evans, 1989; Gilovich, 1991; Johnson-Laird,
2006; Nickerson, 2008). People, for example, tend to seek con-
ﬁrmatory information that supports their belief and be overly
inﬂuenced by this information, but neglect information that is
critical of their belief (Nickerson, 1998, 2008). People may also
use inefﬁcient strategies that waste effort on non-diagnostic data
(Fischoff and Beyth-Marom, 1983; Evans, 1989; Johnson-Laird,
2006) or focus on heuristics (Kahneman et al., 1982; Gigeren-
zer and Gaissmaier, 2011; Kahneman, 2011; see also Gilovich
et al., 2002). Indeed, the heuristic of anchoring and adjustment,
which reﬂects the general tendency to rely on initial judgements
and discount newly obtained information, means that knowl-
edge received after the initial judgment may be distorted to ﬁt
the original hypothesis. In support of this, there is research sug-
gesting that beliefs may persevere even when the initial evidence
for the beliefs is discredited (Ross et al., 1975, 1977; Ander-
son et al., 1980). As a result of these biases, people can accept
beliefs without sufﬁcient evidence and also retain incorrect beliefs
longer than would be case if they sought out diagnostic infor-
mation. The collective impact of these tendencies is that people
(i.e., their cognitive systems) are unlikely to seek information
that contradicts their proto-belief, so long as the proto-belief is
consistent with pre-existing beliefs or satisﬁes strong emotional
drivers.
Emotion can also clearly bias belief evaluation. Mood states,
for example, have been shown to inﬂuence the amount of effort
individuals spend on processing information: individuals may be
more highly motivated to scrutinise persuasive arguments (and
therefore to be more inﬂuenced by the quality of these arguments)
when in a negative rather than positive or neutral mood (Forgas,
2000). Similarly, individuals are more likely to recall memories
that are congruent with their current emotions than memories
that are incongruent (Mathews and MacLeod, 1994; Kihlstrom
et al., 2000). The affective consequences of proto-beliefs may also
bias evaluation, such that proto-beliefs which offer security and
self-esteem may be less heavily scrutinised (Kunda, 1990; Gilovich,
1991; Helzer and Dunning, 2012). Emotion, mood, and motiva-
tional factors may thus inﬂuence both the level of scrutiny and the
criteria used to evaluate proto-beliefs.
In the case of some delusions, particularly those involving
bizarre and highly implausible content, a formal deﬁcit in belief
evaluationmay be implicated in the uncritical acceptance of beliefs
(Langdon and Coltheart, 2000; Turner and Coltheart, 2010). This
deﬁcit in belief evaluation could result in a tendency to be overly
swayed by current experience, which provides evidence for a
delusional explanation, and to downplay stored knowledge and
past experience that would undermine the delusional explanation
(Hemsley, 1993; McKay, 2012). As a result, ideas that would oth-
erwise be rejected may instead be accepted as belief. Such a deﬁcit,
however,would not necessarily be required to explain all delusions,
particularly those of more mundane content or that are consistent
with other pre-existing beliefs.
The signiﬁcant limitations of ordinary belief evaluation could
also lead to the acceptance of unusual beliefs in the absence of
pathology (Pechey and Halligan, 2011). The tendency to seek con-
ﬁrmatory evidence and be overly inﬂuenced by it, in particular,
could lead to the acceptance or entertainment of unusual beliefs.
Likewise, if an individual has strong pre-existing beliefs that are
consistent with a delusional account, these beliefs might lead to
acceptance of the delusional accountwithout any additional deﬁcit
in belief evaluation. In this latter case, the new delusion would ﬁt
within the pre-existing web of beliefs, so would be accepted, while
intact belief evaluation could serve to eliminate alternative, non-
delusional accounts that are not consistent with the pre-existing
web of beliefs.
IV. ACCEPTING OR HOLDING THE BELIEF
Proto-beliefs that survive scrutiny become accepted beliefs,
although as pointed out earlier, the subject may not necessarily
be aware of this. Across other stages, subjects are unlikely to have
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access to many of the unconscious process involved, and may only
become consciously aware of the belief when asked to reﬂect on it
(see Halligan and Oakley, 2000). A person’s subsequent behavioral
change, emotional response, evidential reﬂection, and reporting
can provide evidence of the degree of conviction in such a belief.
This conviction is likely to depend on the same two key criteria in
belief evaluation, namely the extent to which the belief explains
and predicts their experience of the world (i.e., its observational
adequacy), and the degree to which the belief is congruent with
other beliefs (i.e., conservation of pre-existing beliefs). Both crite-
ria, however,may vary across time and across different contexts, so
it is possible for some beliefs to vary in the conviction with which
they are held. Delusions, likewise, can very over time and in differ-
ent contexts (Bisiach et al., 1991; Sharp et al., 1996; Connors and
Coltheart, 2011). Newly formed beliefs, however, that ﬁt within
a coherent, pre-existing web of other beliefs are likely to remain
relatively stable over time.
V. CONSEQUENTIAL EFFECTS OF HOLDING THE BELIEF
When a belief is accepted as true and held as such, it can have
immediate effects on the overall cognitive system, though this may
depend on the environmental opportunities for demonstrating the
belief. New beliefs will contribute, depending on their immediate
relevance, to conﬁguring the person’s perception, memory, and
action. As a result, the person will perceive the world in a way
that is consistent with the new and congruent existing beliefs.
There is, for example, considerable evidence that beliefs can act
to bias the perception and interpretation of information so that
it is consistent with the beliefs (e.g., Hastorf and Cantril, 1954;
Lord et al., 1979; Jones and Russell, 1980; Vallone et al., 1985;
Gilovich, 1991). Ambiguous information may thus be perceived
in a way that ﬁts preconceptions, and so lead to the elaboration
and extension of the existing beliefs. By updating a subject’s web
of beliefs, the new belief also inﬂuences future attempts to explain
unusual events and may constrain what other proto-beliefs can be
accepted.
Beliefs, whatever their neural or cognitive structure, may ulti-
mately depend upon multi-distributed memories systems for
their retention and accessibility. Beliefs, however, can also have
a powerful and direct impact on memory. Once beliefs are
formed, they promote the encoding and retrieval of memories
that are consistent with the cognitive and emotional content
of the beliefs (Conway, 2005; Berna et al., 2014). In addition,
retrieved memories may be reinterpreted, or even distorted, to
ﬁt these beliefs (see Loftus, 2004; Schacter et al., 2011). Repeated
retrieval may reinforce beliefs in other ways as well. Repeated
retrieval of memories, for example, may lead to the gradual
loss of their details, such that the memories become increas-
ingly summarized in a more abstract form. These abstract
representations, in turn, may eventually come to contribute to
the content and elaboration of beliefs (Berna et al., 2014). As
a result of these various processes, memories remain largely
coherent with beliefs and serve to reinforce them. Indepen-
dent of these effects, subjects may act on or publically endorse
new beliefs. This commitment – or subjects’ memory of their
relevant behavior – can, by itself, contribute to the belief ’s
maintenance (Festinger, 1962; Bem, 1967). For most beliefs,
however, it is likely that subjects remain unaware of the belief and
only experience the belief ’s cognitive, behavioral, and emotional
effects.
These processes are also likely to occur in delusions. In the
same way as other beliefs, delusions may lead people to inter-
pret ambiguous information in a way that is consistent with their
belief. There is evidence, for example, that peoplewith paranormal
beliefs tend to misinterpret normal events as paranormal (Ayeroff
and Abelson, 1976; Benassi et al., 1979; Jones and Russell, 1980;
Singer and Benassi, 1981; Irwin, 2009). In so doing, delusions may
thus conﬁgure other cognitive systems, such as those of attention,
perception and memory, to experience the world in a way that
is consistent with the delusion. In the case of Capgras delusion,
for example, a person may not only believe that their loved one is
an impostor, but come to experience their loved one as an impos-
tor when interacting with them (Young, 2008, 2010). This may
serve to reinforce and maintain the belief in the absence of any
other supporting evidence. Likewise, delusions likely determine
the encoding and retrieval of memories in ways that support and
reinforce the delusional beliefs (Berna et al., 2014).
Furthermore, delusions likely inﬂuence a person’s search for
meaning in future events. In this way, the delusion is further rein-
forced and extended as other events are incorporated as evidence
for the delusion, even if the precursor itself is no longer present.
The net result may be a systematised delusional framework,
particularly if the delusion affects appraisals of ongoing events
(Cummings, 1985; Roberts, 1992). Despite these widespread cog-
nitive effects, however, it should be noted that not all individuals
act on their delusions. Some individuals who develop a delusion
without other impairmentsmay recognise that other peoplewould
consider their belief to be highly implausible, and so choose not
to express their belief or act on it. Indeed, for the most part, only
individuals who publically express their delusions or act on them,
such that it attracts the attention of family members or health
services, may be recruited for formal research.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Although admittedly underspeciﬁed and limited by the paucity
of research, this non-recursive ﬁve stage approach to character-
izing belief formation and acceptance has the merits of being
relatively parsimonious in the preparation of a more comprehen-
sive integration of ﬁndings from cognitive and neuropsychological
studies. We suggest that a complete theory of belief will need to
account for at least these ﬁve stages. We acknowledge, however,
that there are a number of challenges to investigating belief and
developing a more comprehensive theoretical model. A particu-
larly signiﬁcant challenge is bridging the gap between research on
delusions and laboratory-based researchwith healthy participants.
Here, the multidimensional nature of belief requires careful con-
sideration when operationalizing belief for experimental research.
Similar beliefs, for example, can arise from direct experience or
from accepting the testimony of trusted others, which can make
it difﬁcult to isolate speciﬁc mechanisms. Likewise, some pro-
cesses, such as social inﬂuence, can affect a number of different
stages of belief, which can also make it difﬁcult to isolate spe-
ciﬁc stages. In addition, beliefs, even those espousing the same
content, can very considerably in other properties, such as the
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conviction with which they held, their degree of preoccupation,
and their impact on behavior, which presents further practical
challenges.
In future, existing methodologies from many areas of cognitive
sciencemay be readily adapted for investigating and characterizing
the cognitive architecture of non-pathological belief formation,
maintenance, and revision. Areas of research that involve cognitive
representations of the external environment – such as social cogni-
tion,memory, attitudes, social inﬂuence, and top–down inﬂuences
on attention and perception – are all likely to be inﬂuenced by
existing belief in some capacity and so may be particularly rele-
vant. In addition to delusions, other pathologies may also provide
insight into belief. Anosognosia – the denial of impairment, such
as physical incapacity after stroke – shares many similarities to
delusion and may provide important insights into how contra-
dictory evidence is processed and managed (Vocat et al., 2013).
Obsessive-compulsive disorder – an anxiety disorder involving
intrusive thoughts and compulsive behaviors – can, in some cases,
involve a dissociation between belief (e.g., knowing that the door is
locked or stove is turned off) and behavior (e.g., repeated checking
and rituals; Szechtman and Woody, 2004). As such, it may be par-
ticularly relevant to understanding the effect of belief on action.
Hallucinations may also be informative about belief if one com-
pares patients with insight (and who do not believe in the external
reality of their hallucinations) to those without (who believe in
the external reality of their hallucinations). As in other areas of
cognitive science, however, it is likely that speciﬁc paradigms will
need to be developed to investigate the underlying processes and
dimensions of belief.
Despite these challenges and the paucity of current research,
belief is too important a topic to not be the subject of formal
investigation in its own right. Beliefs provide the basis for inter-
acting with the world and are intimately involved in co-ordinating
many other cognitive processes. Beliefs are also central to many
social processes and provide the basis for identity, social cohesion,
and social conﬂict. Moreover, beliefs are critical to understand-
ing many psychiatric and psychological pathologies that cause
great suffering. Thus, in addition to possible clinical applications,
greater insight into the cognitive processes of belief promises a
better understanding of cognitive systems, social dynamics, and
ourselves.
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